Our time in the current years is already observing a shift in the dominance of nations towards countries of South like India and China. South South Cooperation has achieved a new meaning in the context of this shift in the dominance towards Southern Countries. Additionally, countries of Europe have been going through sovereign debt crisis. This has added to the woes of North North cooperation.
Growing protectionism in U.S driven by the financial crisis has acted as a barrier in determining a smooth transition to North South Cooperation. With this premise the importance of South South Cooperation has increased. This article would not however dwell on these dimensions of South South Cooperation. This short note would rather explore theoretical generic question of whether cooperation of South South nature is driven by the state and nature of democratization of the two states that get involved in cooperation.
So the basic question that we explore in this note is – Does the nature, state of democratization of two states in a South South cooperation guarantee or ascertain the degree, extent and sustainability of cooperation?
In order to get an answer to this question we have to first search through the extensive literature on democratization. Dahl (1998) suggests that democratization as a subject has been widely researched. Geddes (1999) provides extensive literature for Latin America on nature of democracy. However Collier, Levitsky (1997), Geddes (1999), Kitschelt (1992), Remmer (1996) provides us with literature on how and why democracies sustain and how quality of a democracy determines that longevity. Literature validates that quality and longevity of democracy of a country to a large extent is being determined by the level of economic development.
Economic development has also a considerable effect on the sustainability of democracy (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). Sustainability of democracy is ensured by higher levels of economic development along with other factors like degree of socioeconomic equality. So two countries which can be at the same levels of development can forge a larger beneficial spillovers from cooperation. South South Cooperation between countries at similar levels of development thus might work if we try to bridge this theory of democracy to nature of South South Cooperation.
Additionally, two countries can be at different levels of democratization levels but still cooperation can emerge with a vision of complementary partnership. In terms of South South Cooperation the level of democratisation in two partnering countries might not always be a key factor.
However the level of democratization and stable political environment in two countries can help in forging of the cooperation measures. According to Fish (1998), Kopstein &Reilly (1999), economic reform is one of the best indicators of democratization. In this regard, one needs to see how various countries of South are performing in terms of sustainability, longevity of democracy.
Rich post socialist countries have performed better in terms of sustainability of democracy whereas countries like Albania, Kyrgyztan have been moving away. Sustainability of democratization is guaranteed by economic growth and reforms that can reduce the authoritarian structure of the ruling party. Also with higher economic growth often the accountability of people of the nation can increase with the implementation of necessary domestic reform measures. Public pressure for accountability of the government, larger civil society participation and increased levels of education are some of the outcomes that incur with the advent of economic reforms which leads to larger transparency and democratization on the path of increasing democratization. The moot question is whether occurrence of such conditions in two countries forging a South South Cooperation facilitate the chance and nature of longevity of the nature of cooperation.
Any cooperation measure which aims to promote development, can benefit the public at large by creating more transparent accountable structures that can sustain the degree of cooperation. The same principle will hold good for South South Cooperation measures.
If there is a chance of economic reform that can happen as a spillover of South South cooperation, then such cooperation measures could be used to create democratization in the countries that get engaged in those measures. Performance of south south cooperation in terms of its sustainability can actually increase if those measures create more stable democratization process as an outcome of cooperation.
If the two nations can discount the fact that such democratization process can start as an outcome of the cooperation, then there is a larger change that they will forge such cooperation provided that the two countries are not being guided by authoritarian government and governance principles.
However whether such democratization will happen or not also depends on the political leadership which is at the centre stage of South South cooperation measures. The value system instilled by the political leaders in the implementation measures of South South cooperation policies will guide the nature of democratization as an outcome of the South South Cooperation measures.
Democratization process can be understood through a short and long term view. The one which has emerged in southern Europe or in East of Africa is more of a long term nature whereas the one which has emerged in Latin America, Europe is of a short term nature (Di Palma, 1990).
The reason behind this different duration of democracy and its effect on economic reform can happen owing to a following reason. In a country which has achieved a new democracy, people are more sensitive and if they expect that there are chances of loosing out from economic reform process in the new democracy then the tensions can increase between a new democracy and economic reform. Precisely this then guides how long a democracy will stay in a country. Two countries in South South Cooperation on same levels of economic development can forge a stronger partnership. But the strength of the partnership will also depend on how internally the people of the countries are managing the tensions between the trade offs of economic reform, democracy and the fears of loosing out from such economic reform process. This can only happen if the domestic governance structures, institutions of the two countries are not able to give confidence to the people of the nation. The degree of confidence giving by the state to the people in turn also depends on the positioning of the democracy and at what point of democracy the two countries are standing out. If the democracy is well rooted to the social origins of the people then the fragility and negativity of the tensions between the people from loosening out from a growing democracy, economic reform process can go down. This can instill larger strength to the nature of democratic functioning of the nations, which thereby can also help in forging in South South Cooperation measures of the two partnering countries.
Historical dynamism and relationship guides this process that can also thereby act as a contributory factor in determining the South South Cooperation relationship of the two countries. The nature of the relationship within the countries and people of the countries also determine the cooperation relationship. One can find linkages between this proposition and Moores work on social origins of democracy . Social origins of democracy will also depend on how people, civil societies are functioning in a democratic state and whether the state is connected to the people through civil society groups. Such connection can go up through reduction in concentration of bureaucratic and aggregated forms of representation. Robust civil society participation, transparent institutional functioning, larger societal disaggregated linkages across the people of the society existing in the nations forging South South Cooperation can pave a way towards stronger social origins of democracy in partnering countries of South South Cooperation.
Sunday, January 30, 2011
Wednesday, January 5, 2011
ETHNICITY AND NUMBER CRUNCHING: WHAT NUMBERS DONOT SAY!
The wish to write this article came while reading through a book titled “Islam in Religion and Politics: Perspectives from South Asia” edited by Asim Ray. The chapter on ethnicity issues in Pakistan and the corresponding repercussions on ethnic conflicts of Pakistan enthused me to think through the concept of ethnic fractionalization. A part of the reason behind this enthusiasm is from the drive to explore the causality that explains the mystery of human beings staying together or not staying together. This is one of the most mysterious aspects of life which are often not guided by any natural laws. As a human being I have most of the time felt confused, or dialectic about this mystery. Whenever that confusion has come I have tried to read something dealing with the anthropocentricity of human civilization.
It is from that state, I thought to start reading behavioural science, political science literature dealing with human conflicts, bondings and ethnicity one year back. Those readings have nurtured the growth of this write up the initiation of which happened with a preliminary googling that revealed an index called “Ethno Linguistic Fragmentation Index/ Ethno Nationalist Exclusion Index”.
This index is a simple extended version of market concentration index which shows the likelihood whether two people chosen at random will be from different ethnic groups. It is an extended form of simple Herfindahl concentration index.
The closer the value of the index to 1 the larger is ethnic fractionalization. The index value for some of the countries that suffered from conflicts generated from resource curse challenges is close to 1.
However, according to some literature[1] ethno linguistic fragmentation index is not able to capture the multidimensional aspects of ethnic fractionalisation. So a better way to address that is through an index of ethno nationalist exclusion which brings out state centric differences in ethnic fractionalization in a country.
This kind of index has been applied in studying the ethnic fractionalization in many resource rich countries where conflicts have arisen in resource abundant areas.
But the numbers do not reveal and get into the intricacies of several factors (including the cultural and emotional ones) that play a critical role in creating ethnic fractionalization and corresponding conflicts. Also often the numbers don’t talk about the human element that is very important in guiding the implications of ethnic fractionalization.
The next sections of this article entails some of the factors that explains ethnic fractionalization starting with some definitional aspects of ethnic fractionalization.
1 Ethnic fractionalization
In order to address the issue of ethnic fractionalization the concept of ethnic divide has to be pondered and understood first. An ethnic divide could originate between people and communities, groups due to their lineage to various religions, caste, culture, language and rule by which they are governed.
With respect to the definitional aspects of “Ethnic Fractionalization”, Horowitz[2] has defined ethnic fractionalization on the basis of indicators like appearance, religion, language and any combination of these ones.
Max Weber suggested that ethnicity is defined by belief structures in a community or in a group with a common descent that is demarcated by tribe, race, casts, religion, language, and[3] nationality. Different theories[4] exist that tries to explain how an ethnic fractionalization in a community could lead to conflicts. These theories include - the primordial sociality; clash of cultures; ethnic security dilemma ; mobilization of ethnic groups[5]. Each of these theories tries to explain how differences in ethnicity causes conflict in a particular situation.
According to primordial sociality theory[6], a human being sees any bondage with a particular ethnicity in a collective way and perceives the bondage to be given from outside in a coercive way. The clash of culture suggests that ethnic fractionalization emanates from belonging of human beings to different civilization origins[7]. Ethnic security dilemma arises when human beings from some ethnic groups suddenly are in a situation when they have to protect themselves for their own survival because of a certain adverse event say like an oil spillage affecting communities. In such a situation, human beings from one group of ethnic origin in the presence of other ethnic groups goes through a philosophical, introspecting discourse driving them to think that each community should protect themselves and their ethnic community first as they visualize the human beings from other groups, ethnicity in a competitive frame of mind.
Ethnic fractionalization is a kind of variable that arises out of social construction. Such social construction is often developed to push forward the political goals of institutions and other identities that could contribute to ethnic fractionalization for short term political gains. All these factors create differences in ethnicity and belief structures amongst people.
Governance of conflicts arising from such belief structures have to analyze how such costs can affect belief structures of the people of different ethnicities leading to conflicts. Political economy of governance institutions driven by people of different ethnicities could also exacerbate such feuds. Often religion also can also contribute in shaping up ethnicity.
1.1 Religion
Religion has played a prominent role in creating ethnic fractionalization in some select countries. Tensions and mistrust could often arise owing to a difference in the lineage of the people to different religions. Many intra community conflicts in countries have resulted owing to mistrust that has an origination in the different belief structures arising from belonging to various religions.
Many of these people have belonging to various religious institutions to which they belong before Christianity and Islam spread in these countries. In these countries the social process and the legal regimes did not facilitate a mix of the two different ethnic identities arising from different religious structures.
In addition to religion, institutions also play a role in the ethnic fractionalization.
1.2 Institutions
Strong government and political institutions with a welfare philosophy for people of all groups and an objective of ethnic fractionalization reduction might have been able to tackle problem. Powell (1982) shows that an association exists between ethnic fractionalization and instability of institutions. Powell suggests that in a region with an increase in ethnic fractionalization, the propensity of instability in the institution goes up.
Once that instability goes up, chances of reduction of ethnic fractionalization goes down. Also role of formal institutions play a key role towards enhancement of fractionalization.
But other than formal, informal institutions also have a strong role to play towards ethnic fractionalization. Informal institutional structures play a key role in binding and hindering the transmission of ethnic heterogeneity to potential conflicts. Such informal institutional structures have also helped in cross ethnic tie ups through a structure called “cousinage”. Cousinage has happened because of historical alliances of families between various ethnic groups through the basis of patronyms. This cousinage has facilitated social interactions between various ethnic groups and has played a key role in binding them together.
To illustrate cousinage, one could say that somebody in a community group in Mali, belonging to Keita surname could easily interact with another person with a surname of Coulibaly[8] even if they have not interacted earlier. Cross ethnic interactions bounded by informal institutional structures have prevailed in these countries and helped in maintaining strong bondage between human beings.
Also transethnicity play a key role towards determination of conflicts. Studies done by Easterly and Levine (1997)[9], Posner (2004)[10] suggest that the effects of these transethnicities on socio economic variables of the communities have been adverse leading to larger ethnic fractionalization.
Larger ethnic fractionalization could lead to a delay in creation of public goods dealing with health service, education and infrastructure[11] owing to large transaction cost that could arise due to ethnic fractionalization.
To eradicate this condition, larger effective institutional intervention for governance is required. In the presence of ethnic clouting and rent seeking in governance positions, quality of infrastructure service provision could go down.
However as a contrast, the picture has been very optimistic in some African countries. For example in countries like Malawi, Namibia institutions have worked well.
In Malawi, groups belonging to Chewa, Nyanja, and Tumbuka language are the largest. But inspite of that no dominance of groups has happened. Similarly in Namibia, although the ethnicity belonging to Ovambo is the dominant segment of the population, the other ethnic groups are given importance in terms of their representation in the institutions. Dominance of groups have been eradicated to bring in effective institutional intervention.
Some other explanatory factors
Inter community factors of fractionalization is frequently influenced by the nature of ethnic competition. According to Dion Douglas (1997)[12] ethnic competition gives rise to germination of ethnic conflicts. In a drive for competition, lower trust levels are developed that impinges communities of various ethnicities from forming social networks[13].
Such social networks could happen through larger inter ethnic cultural exchanges, frequent social gatherings and bondage between the groups. One of the essential requirements for such bondage requires creation of a value system of respect for each others ethnic customs, rights, rituals.
Often absence of such a value system hinders creation of a space for social networking. This is further facilitated by the drive of each ethnicity giving larger space to their own culture, customs without providing sufficient space to the other ethnic culture and customs. Such an action is also often incentivised by a drive to have monetary and control of power that could maximize the ethnic capital[14].
Therefore, each ethnic group in the process of maximizing ethnic capital becomes narrowed in their own ethnicity and reduces overall social capital that leads to a larger fractionalization.
Cultural factors[15] that create fractionalization amongst ethnic communities include the differences in language, living style, day to day actions[16] and their affinity to various ethnic cultural preferences by birth. Mostly between the ethnic tribes there is a pattern of sticking to the cultural heritages that any generation has imbibed from earlier generation by birth. This affinity to a lineage by birth could often act as a hindrance towards cultural homogenization of various ethnicities and can lead to fractionalization. It is felt that creation of platforms for cross cultural exchange at regular intervals across various ethnic community domains could be one of the ways to bridge the differences in the cultural attributes of the communities. This could therefore pave a long way towards reduction of ethnic fractionalization.
Demographic and institutional factors are also posed to contribute to ethnic fractionalization process. Failed institutions are being thought to be one of the key factors towards ethnic fractionalization.
According to Sambanis and Elbadawi, (2000)[17], too much of diversity in ethnic groups necessarily won’t allow to create conflict if the institutions are working well as they won’t allow groups to cohesively create a conflict.
According to them when an ethnic group has a larger dominance to the extent of 60% of the population then it has sufficient power to create conflicts. But below that extent, with the existence of many ethnicities if the institutions are functioning well then even with the presence of ethnic fractionalization, conflicts could be checked.
Conclusion
Ethnic fractionalization within and between communities could act as a mechanism to facilitate, enhance the distrust and could contribute towards larger distress and dissent which therefore raises the degree and chance of a conflict. Such distrust could arise because of various intra community and inter community sociological constructs. Additionally, historical, institutional, cultural factors would also play a critical role in the formation, extent and persistence of the distrust.
There is a critical role of governance oversights, efficient functioning of institutions, homogenous wellfaristic polity with a larger holistic accommodative social welfare goals that could reduce such distrust and conflict. Participatory decision making at the community level, effective and efficient democracy with equal weightage to all ethnicity are some of the ways by which these community conflicts could be addressed.
While doing that policies have to be streamlined and those policies have to consider how each of the indicators affecting ethnic fractionalization is influenced through policy actions. The formulation of such a policy would involve dedicated participation from all groups, ethnicities and stakeholders.
References
Abubakar, D. (2001). “Ethnic Identity, Democratization, and the Future of the African State: Lessons from Nigeria”. Ethnicity and Recent Democratic Experiments in Africa, African Issues, 29(1/2):31-36.
Anthony D. Smith, Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 16, No. 6 (Nov., 1987), pp. 774-775 , Published by: American Sociological Association
Dion, D. (1997). “Competition and Ethnic conflict: Artifactual?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(5): 638-648.
Easterly, W. (2001). “Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic conflict?” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49(4): 687-706.
Elbadawi, I., & Sambanis, N. (2000). “Why are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict”. Journal of African Economies, 9(3): 244-269.
Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analysis of Huntington's Thesis, JONATHAN FOX , British Journal of Political Science (2002), 32:3:415-434 Cambridge University Press, Copyright © 2002 Cambridge University Presshttp://www.iss.co.za/Books/Angola/6Malaquias.pdf last accessed on Dec 15, 2009, Ethnicity and conflict in Angola: prospects for reconciliation, Assis Malaquias
Fearon, James D. (2003). “Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity by Country.” Journal of Economic Growth 8 (June): 195-222.http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/wgape/papers/5_Bannon.pdf last accessed on Dec 19, 2009, Working Paper No. 44, SOURCES OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION IN AFRICA, by Alicia Bannon, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner
Goodin, Robert E. and Charles Tilly, eds. 2006. Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Goodwin, Jeff. (2001). No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.
http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2340=socio-economic-effects-of-gold-mining-in-mali last accessed on Dec 14 2009
James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, 1 (February 2003):75-90
Martin, Hans-Peter and Harald Schumann. 1998. The Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Democracy and Prosperity. London and New York: Zed
Nordic Journal of African Studies 15(1): 42–52 (2006) The Security Dilemma and Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, MATTHEW KIRWIN, Michigan State University, USA
O’Neal, John R. and Russett B. (1999b) ‘The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992’, World Politics 52: 1-37.
Oladimeji Aborisade and Robert J. Mundt (1999). Politics in Nigeria, New York: Longman Publishers http://www.jsd-africa.com/Jsda/Fallwinter2000/articlespdf/ARC-Development%20in%20Nigeria.pdf last accessed on Dec 15, 2009, Development in Nigeria: A Political and Economic Challeng, Emmanuel O. Oritsejafor
Race, Ethnicity, and the Weberian Legacy, JOHN STONE, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 38, No. 3, 391-406 (1995)
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45:259-282.
Socio-Economic Effects of Gold Mining in Mali, A Study of the Sadiola and MorilaMining Operations, Eyolf Jul-Larsen, Bréhima Kassibo, Siri Lange, Ingrid SamsetR 2006: CHR. Michelsen Institute
Socio-Economic Effects of Gold Mining in Mali, A Study of the Sadiola and MorilaMining Operations, Eyolf Jul-Larsen, Bréhima Kassibo, Siri Lange, Ingrid SamsetR 2006: CHR. Michelsen Institute,pg30http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/198-natural-resources/48504-a-humanitarian-disaster-in-the-making-along-the-chad-cameroon-oil-pipeline.html last accessed on 14th December, 2009
Socio-Economic Effects of Gold Mining in Mali, A Study of the Sadiola and MorilaMining Operations, Eyolf Jul-Larsen, Bréhima Kassibo, Siri Lange, Ingrid SamsetR 2006: CHR. Michelsen Institute
[1] Institutional obstacles to African economic development: State, ethnicity, and customJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 71, Issue 3, September 2009, Pages 669-689Jean-Philippe Platteau
[2] Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.
[3] Race, Ethnicity, and the Weberian Legacy, JOHN STONE, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 38, No. 3, 391-406 (1995)
[4] Yinger, J. Milton. 1985. “Ethnicity.” Annual Review of Sociology 11:151-80.
[5] Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45:259-282.12 Anthony D. Smith, Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 16, No. 6 (Nov., 1987), pp. 774-775, Published by: American Sociological Association
[7] Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analysis of Huntington's Thesis, JONATHAN FOX , British Journal of Political Science (2002), 32:3:415-434 Cambridge University Press, Copyright © 2002 Cambridge University Press
[8] Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting:
Results from an Experiment in Mali, Thad Dunning1 and Lauren Harrison2, Yale Universityhttp://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/wip/Dunning%20and%20Harrison_102608.pdf last accessed 5th Jan, 2009
[9] Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 1997. “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic
Divisions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(November): 1203-50.
[10] Posner, Daniel. 2004. “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa.” American Journal of
Political Science 48(October): 849-63.
[11] Alesina, Alberto, and E. La Ferrara. 2005. “Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance.”
Journal of Economic Literature 43(September): 762-800.
[12] Dion, D. (1997). “Competition and Ethnic conflict: Artifactual?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(5): 638-648.
[13] Easterly, W. (2001). “Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic conflict?” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49(4): 687-706.
[14] Ethnic capital could be seen as a capital that gives returns to future generations of a particular ethnicity. Such ethnic capital is formed by investments made in an ethnic environment by parents for their future generation. Source - http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v107y1992i1p123-50.html last accessed on Dec 24, 2009
[15] Fearon, James D. 2003. “Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity by Country.” Journal of Economic Growth 8 (June): 195-222.
[16] http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/wgape/papers/5_Bannon.pdf last accessed on Dec 19, 2009, Working Paper No. 44, SOURCES OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION IN AFRICA, by Alicia Bannon, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner
[17] Elbadawi, I., & Sambanis, N. (2000). “Why are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict”. Journal of African Economies, 9(3): 244-269.
It is from that state, I thought to start reading behavioural science, political science literature dealing with human conflicts, bondings and ethnicity one year back. Those readings have nurtured the growth of this write up the initiation of which happened with a preliminary googling that revealed an index called “Ethno Linguistic Fragmentation Index/ Ethno Nationalist Exclusion Index”.
This index is a simple extended version of market concentration index which shows the likelihood whether two people chosen at random will be from different ethnic groups. It is an extended form of simple Herfindahl concentration index.
The closer the value of the index to 1 the larger is ethnic fractionalization. The index value for some of the countries that suffered from conflicts generated from resource curse challenges is close to 1.
However, according to some literature[1] ethno linguistic fragmentation index is not able to capture the multidimensional aspects of ethnic fractionalisation. So a better way to address that is through an index of ethno nationalist exclusion which brings out state centric differences in ethnic fractionalization in a country.
This kind of index has been applied in studying the ethnic fractionalization in many resource rich countries where conflicts have arisen in resource abundant areas.
But the numbers do not reveal and get into the intricacies of several factors (including the cultural and emotional ones) that play a critical role in creating ethnic fractionalization and corresponding conflicts. Also often the numbers don’t talk about the human element that is very important in guiding the implications of ethnic fractionalization.
The next sections of this article entails some of the factors that explains ethnic fractionalization starting with some definitional aspects of ethnic fractionalization.
1 Ethnic fractionalization
In order to address the issue of ethnic fractionalization the concept of ethnic divide has to be pondered and understood first. An ethnic divide could originate between people and communities, groups due to their lineage to various religions, caste, culture, language and rule by which they are governed.
With respect to the definitional aspects of “Ethnic Fractionalization”, Horowitz[2] has defined ethnic fractionalization on the basis of indicators like appearance, religion, language and any combination of these ones.
Max Weber suggested that ethnicity is defined by belief structures in a community or in a group with a common descent that is demarcated by tribe, race, casts, religion, language, and[3] nationality. Different theories[4] exist that tries to explain how an ethnic fractionalization in a community could lead to conflicts. These theories include - the primordial sociality; clash of cultures; ethnic security dilemma ; mobilization of ethnic groups[5]. Each of these theories tries to explain how differences in ethnicity causes conflict in a particular situation.
According to primordial sociality theory[6], a human being sees any bondage with a particular ethnicity in a collective way and perceives the bondage to be given from outside in a coercive way. The clash of culture suggests that ethnic fractionalization emanates from belonging of human beings to different civilization origins[7]. Ethnic security dilemma arises when human beings from some ethnic groups suddenly are in a situation when they have to protect themselves for their own survival because of a certain adverse event say like an oil spillage affecting communities. In such a situation, human beings from one group of ethnic origin in the presence of other ethnic groups goes through a philosophical, introspecting discourse driving them to think that each community should protect themselves and their ethnic community first as they visualize the human beings from other groups, ethnicity in a competitive frame of mind.
Ethnic fractionalization is a kind of variable that arises out of social construction. Such social construction is often developed to push forward the political goals of institutions and other identities that could contribute to ethnic fractionalization for short term political gains. All these factors create differences in ethnicity and belief structures amongst people.
Governance of conflicts arising from such belief structures have to analyze how such costs can affect belief structures of the people of different ethnicities leading to conflicts. Political economy of governance institutions driven by people of different ethnicities could also exacerbate such feuds. Often religion also can also contribute in shaping up ethnicity.
1.1 Religion
Religion has played a prominent role in creating ethnic fractionalization in some select countries. Tensions and mistrust could often arise owing to a difference in the lineage of the people to different religions. Many intra community conflicts in countries have resulted owing to mistrust that has an origination in the different belief structures arising from belonging to various religions.
Many of these people have belonging to various religious institutions to which they belong before Christianity and Islam spread in these countries. In these countries the social process and the legal regimes did not facilitate a mix of the two different ethnic identities arising from different religious structures.
In addition to religion, institutions also play a role in the ethnic fractionalization.
1.2 Institutions
Strong government and political institutions with a welfare philosophy for people of all groups and an objective of ethnic fractionalization reduction might have been able to tackle problem. Powell (1982) shows that an association exists between ethnic fractionalization and instability of institutions. Powell suggests that in a region with an increase in ethnic fractionalization, the propensity of instability in the institution goes up.
Once that instability goes up, chances of reduction of ethnic fractionalization goes down. Also role of formal institutions play a key role towards enhancement of fractionalization.
But other than formal, informal institutions also have a strong role to play towards ethnic fractionalization. Informal institutional structures play a key role in binding and hindering the transmission of ethnic heterogeneity to potential conflicts. Such informal institutional structures have also helped in cross ethnic tie ups through a structure called “cousinage”. Cousinage has happened because of historical alliances of families between various ethnic groups through the basis of patronyms. This cousinage has facilitated social interactions between various ethnic groups and has played a key role in binding them together.
To illustrate cousinage, one could say that somebody in a community group in Mali, belonging to Keita surname could easily interact with another person with a surname of Coulibaly[8] even if they have not interacted earlier. Cross ethnic interactions bounded by informal institutional structures have prevailed in these countries and helped in maintaining strong bondage between human beings.
Also transethnicity play a key role towards determination of conflicts. Studies done by Easterly and Levine (1997)[9], Posner (2004)[10] suggest that the effects of these transethnicities on socio economic variables of the communities have been adverse leading to larger ethnic fractionalization.
Larger ethnic fractionalization could lead to a delay in creation of public goods dealing with health service, education and infrastructure[11] owing to large transaction cost that could arise due to ethnic fractionalization.
To eradicate this condition, larger effective institutional intervention for governance is required. In the presence of ethnic clouting and rent seeking in governance positions, quality of infrastructure service provision could go down.
However as a contrast, the picture has been very optimistic in some African countries. For example in countries like Malawi, Namibia institutions have worked well.
In Malawi, groups belonging to Chewa, Nyanja, and Tumbuka language are the largest. But inspite of that no dominance of groups has happened. Similarly in Namibia, although the ethnicity belonging to Ovambo is the dominant segment of the population, the other ethnic groups are given importance in terms of their representation in the institutions. Dominance of groups have been eradicated to bring in effective institutional intervention.
Some other explanatory factors
Inter community factors of fractionalization is frequently influenced by the nature of ethnic competition. According to Dion Douglas (1997)[12] ethnic competition gives rise to germination of ethnic conflicts. In a drive for competition, lower trust levels are developed that impinges communities of various ethnicities from forming social networks[13].
Such social networks could happen through larger inter ethnic cultural exchanges, frequent social gatherings and bondage between the groups. One of the essential requirements for such bondage requires creation of a value system of respect for each others ethnic customs, rights, rituals.
Often absence of such a value system hinders creation of a space for social networking. This is further facilitated by the drive of each ethnicity giving larger space to their own culture, customs without providing sufficient space to the other ethnic culture and customs. Such an action is also often incentivised by a drive to have monetary and control of power that could maximize the ethnic capital[14].
Therefore, each ethnic group in the process of maximizing ethnic capital becomes narrowed in their own ethnicity and reduces overall social capital that leads to a larger fractionalization.
Cultural factors[15] that create fractionalization amongst ethnic communities include the differences in language, living style, day to day actions[16] and their affinity to various ethnic cultural preferences by birth. Mostly between the ethnic tribes there is a pattern of sticking to the cultural heritages that any generation has imbibed from earlier generation by birth. This affinity to a lineage by birth could often act as a hindrance towards cultural homogenization of various ethnicities and can lead to fractionalization. It is felt that creation of platforms for cross cultural exchange at regular intervals across various ethnic community domains could be one of the ways to bridge the differences in the cultural attributes of the communities. This could therefore pave a long way towards reduction of ethnic fractionalization.
Demographic and institutional factors are also posed to contribute to ethnic fractionalization process. Failed institutions are being thought to be one of the key factors towards ethnic fractionalization.
According to Sambanis and Elbadawi, (2000)[17], too much of diversity in ethnic groups necessarily won’t allow to create conflict if the institutions are working well as they won’t allow groups to cohesively create a conflict.
According to them when an ethnic group has a larger dominance to the extent of 60% of the population then it has sufficient power to create conflicts. But below that extent, with the existence of many ethnicities if the institutions are functioning well then even with the presence of ethnic fractionalization, conflicts could be checked.
Conclusion
Ethnic fractionalization within and between communities could act as a mechanism to facilitate, enhance the distrust and could contribute towards larger distress and dissent which therefore raises the degree and chance of a conflict. Such distrust could arise because of various intra community and inter community sociological constructs. Additionally, historical, institutional, cultural factors would also play a critical role in the formation, extent and persistence of the distrust.
There is a critical role of governance oversights, efficient functioning of institutions, homogenous wellfaristic polity with a larger holistic accommodative social welfare goals that could reduce such distrust and conflict. Participatory decision making at the community level, effective and efficient democracy with equal weightage to all ethnicity are some of the ways by which these community conflicts could be addressed.
While doing that policies have to be streamlined and those policies have to consider how each of the indicators affecting ethnic fractionalization is influenced through policy actions. The formulation of such a policy would involve dedicated participation from all groups, ethnicities and stakeholders.
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[2] Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.
[3] Race, Ethnicity, and the Weberian Legacy, JOHN STONE, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 38, No. 3, 391-406 (1995)
[4] Yinger, J. Milton. 1985. “Ethnicity.” Annual Review of Sociology 11:151-80.
[5] Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45:259-282.12 Anthony D. Smith, Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 16, No. 6 (Nov., 1987), pp. 774-775, Published by: American Sociological Association
[7] Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analysis of Huntington's Thesis, JONATHAN FOX , British Journal of Political Science (2002), 32:3:415-434 Cambridge University Press, Copyright © 2002 Cambridge University Press
[8] Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting:
Results from an Experiment in Mali, Thad Dunning1 and Lauren Harrison2, Yale Universityhttp://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/wip/Dunning%20and%20Harrison_102608.pdf last accessed 5th Jan, 2009
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[14] Ethnic capital could be seen as a capital that gives returns to future generations of a particular ethnicity. Such ethnic capital is formed by investments made in an ethnic environment by parents for their future generation. Source - http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v107y1992i1p123-50.html last accessed on Dec 24, 2009
[15] Fearon, James D. 2003. “Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity by Country.” Journal of Economic Growth 8 (June): 195-222.
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[17] Elbadawi, I., & Sambanis, N. (2000). “Why are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict”. Journal of African Economies, 9(3): 244-269.
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